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Liberation versus Constellation
As 1980 opened there were two major contending thrusts toward 
economic coordination in Southern Africa - the Southern 
African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) launched 
at the July 1979 Arusha Conference of the Front Line States 
and the South African "Constellation of States" endeavour 
highlighted by Prime Minister Botha's November 1979 Carleton 
Center Address.
At that point the future of both was problematic. SADCC 
still lacked a formal interstate agreement and the partici­
pation of the independent states of the region outside the 
Front Line grouping. The critical role of Zimbabwe in the 
struggle for regional coordination was clear. The timing 
and auspices of Zimbabwe's independence appeared to all but 
the most convinced supporters of ZANU CPF) and Robert Mugabe 
to be uncertain. While the distaste of all the independent
Southern African states for a formalisation and solidification
of South Africa's economic hegemony through the "constellation" 
was clear, their ability to resist it was less so.
Early in 1980 ZANU(PF) won the Zimbabwe elections. On
April 1, Prime Minister designate Robert Mugabe initialled
2"Southern Africa: Toward Economic Liberation", the SADCC
Charter endorsed by Heads of State or Government (or in
two cases their representatives) of the nine independent
states of the region. In November SADCC-2 was held in
Maputo with detailed programmes in transport, communications
and food security and attracted pledges of about $650 million
3from over thirty states and institutions. Meanwhile a 
"competing" London constellation revival conference collapsed.
Parallel to the main thrusts were negotiations toward an 
Eastern and Southern African Preferential Trade Area and
i<
toward outlining steps - for effective sanctions against 
South Africa and toward limiting their harmful impact on 
neighbouring states. As 1980 opened, the first - under 
ECA auspices - seemed likely to produce a treaty within 
the year while the latter - under OAU auspices - appeared 
to be making little headway. As of early 1981, the PTA 
was still in official level consultation and negotiation.
The sanctions/support work, however, had acquired a new 
momentum with the much greater OAU/Non-Aligned pressure 
for sanctions following South Africa's sabotage of the4January 1981 Namibia Pre-Implementation Conference.
"Southern Africa: Toward Economic Liberation"
The heads of state or government of Angola, Botswana, 
Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Swaziland, the prime 
minister designate of Zimbabwe, and representatives 5of Lesotho and Malawi met in Lusaka on April 1st 1980 
to consider ways and means to reduce regional dependence - 
especially on South Africa, to forge links toward genuine 
and equitable regional integration, to mobilize resources 
in support of these goals and to secure international 
cooperation for economic liberation. On April 1 they 
adopted the Lusaka Declaration - "Southern Africa: Toward
Economic Liberation" - to form the basis for Southern 
African Development Coordination.
The Declaration, accompanying speeches and backgroundg
papers, suggest commitment to several main themes: develop­
ment of concrete joint programmes among two or more states, 
flexibility, openess for SADCC members to participate in 
other bilateral or regional cooperation groups, identifi­
cation of key areas for initial action, involvement of 
Liberation Movements in manpower development and pre-indepen­
dence economic planning.
-  2 -
-  3 -
SADCC is quite overtly concerned with the liberation of 
Southern Africa. However, unlike the Front Line states, 
it does not focus on political, diplomatic and military 
issues. Rather it is concerned with increasing national 
and regional economic strength and self reliance and with 
reducing concentrated external dependence, especially on 
South Africa. In that sense it is - as the late President 
Khama of Botswana who convened the Arusha and Lusaka meetings 
stressed - not directed against anyone but toward positive 
achievements by its members.
SADCC does not - in standard terms - have a political 
economic ideology. Its concentration on common concerns, 
issues and interests rules that out at the present time.
At least four of its members are following basically 
capitalist strategies with varying degrees of state 
intervention and participation, two pursue interim 
mixed economy strategies with a long term commitment to 
transition to socialism and three are engaged in 
implementing transition to socialism strategies. To 
debate overall issues of political economic strategy at 
the present time would be divisive and divert attention 
from concrete common concerns. A commitment to reduction 
of economic dependence on South Africa, a willingness to 
act jointly to achieve this and acceptance of an important 
role for state economic intervention are perceived as the 
necessary common characteristics for SADCC membership.
In principle membership is open to expansion. In practice 
the only clear case is Namibia on the attainment of genuine 
independence (President Nujuma of SWAPO was officially 
present at the Lusaka Summit). Other states are viewed as 
too far removed from thedominant theme of regional dis­
entanglement from dependence on South Africa.and the 
development of a coherent regional transport and communi­
cations network for membership to be appropriate.
Ultimately Zaire may be seen as a plausible member and
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has evinced some interest in joining but, at present,
SADCC members see closer bilateral relations (by Angola, 
Zambia, Tanzania) and ad hoc sectoral discussions 
(e.g. with Zimbabwe, Zambia, Mozambique, Angola and 
perhaps the SADCC Transport and Communications 
Commission)as more appropriate and productive.
7At Lusaka, as at Arusha, transport and communications 
was identified as the first priority area. A Transport 
and Communications Commission, based in Maputo, was 
constituted by the Lusaka Declaration "to coordinate 
the use of existing systems and the planning and 
financing of additional regional facilities." Other 
priority areas were semi-arid area agricultural research, 
food security, industrial coordination, manpower develop­
ment, energy coordination, financial mechanisms for 
regional projects and the provision of an interim secretariat 
together with evolution of proposals as to a more permanent 
institutional form. These were assigned to Botswana, 
Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Swaziland, Angola, Zambia and 
Botswana respectively to act as coordinating countries, 
draw up proposals and convene official level meetingsg
to report back to the SADCC ministerial meetings.
Dimming of a Constellation
At the end of 1979 the dominant theme in "constellation" 
strategy was "wider still and wider." From the Republic 
of South Africa - Bantustan - Namibia - Zimbabwe - BLS 
core the economic and security grouping would rapidly 
draw in Malawi, Zambia, Zaire, Gabon, the Central African 
Republic and Mauritius and - perhaps less rapidly or 
fully - Mozambique and Angola. South Africa would have 
achieved economic and security lebensraum and the 
Nationalist Party would have reincorporated the doubting 
business community through liberalisation at home and 
outreach regionally.
9Basically supportive writers warned of problems - including
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the lack of acceptance by any independent African state - 
and well disposed but more independent ones'*'0 queried 
whether the overt security/political comradeship aspects 
were practical. What neither took adequate account of 
was the reality of the SADCC challenge or the vital role 
of Zimbabwe in either "constellation" or SADCC.
Early 1980 brought two disasters for "constellation" 
strategies - the ZANU(PF) victory in Zimbabwe and the 
Lusaka Declaration (with Zimbabwe, Swaziland, Lesotho 
and Malawi added to the initial Frontline 5). Not 
merely had a key star fallen from the "constellation" 
but the initiative had clearly switched and the routes 
to reducing trasport and petroleum dependence on South 
Africa were suddenly open.
Thus the objectively greater economic strength of South 
Africa in 1980, its loans to several SADCC states and 
its emergence as a maize granary for a majority not 
only failed to lock the "constellation" in place but 
did not even suffice to keep it as a serious contender 
for regional organizing leadership. The external events 
were compounded by the failure of liberalisation 
domestically leading to the premature 1980 election - 
blacks were not bought off, business and professionals 
did not abandon the PFP, but a right wing Afrikaaner 
backlash threatened to topple Botha.
A 1980 effort to refloat the constellation under the 
auspices of conservative Euro-MP1s, the British South 
African lobby, South African big business, Andreas 
Shipangafwith the attempted addition, Commissioner 
Cheysson of EEC and David Steel of the Liberal Party 
backfired badly. Upon discovering that the proposed 
conference had not only no backing from the independent 
states but their firm opposition and hearing a sharp 
denunciation of it by Botswana President and SADCC 
Chairman Quett Mosire in his address to the European
Parliament, "*"■*" Cheysson and Steel totally disassociated 
themselves from the venture and with neither acceptable 
names nor African state participation it quietly 
expired.
In December 1980 an overtly business (but including
several semi official consultancy body and academic
12speakers) was held at the Royal Swazi Spa. Its 
theme of how to do business both in South Africa and 
the independent states appeared to be an attempt to 
preserve the economic outreach element of the "constellation" 
under business auspices. While held, the conference was 
apparently not notably successful and failed in its goal 
of attracting a major ECA speaker (Bqx Nomvete who was 
listed in that capacity angrily denounced the sponsors 
at the Maputo SADCC for having used his name when he had 
categorically refused to participate).
A further blow to the "constellation" was the April 1981 
Swaziland - Lesotho - Mozambique - Botswana summit on 
economic security in Mbabane. It suggested further erosion 
of even the unwilling acceptance of South African economic 
dominance which had characterized Lesotho, Swaziland and - 
to a lesser degree - Botswana.
Whether a serious attempt can be made to relaunch a more
limited "constellation" of South Africa, the Bantustans,
a "moderate" recognized government in Namibia and BLS
remains to be seen. South Africa has good reason to try
and some to believe the USA would under the present
13administration be supportive. However, there are 
daunting obstacles. BLS would strongly oppose any such 
linkage especially with Bantustans and a Namibistan. No 
viable Namibian "settlement" excluding SWAPO can be
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envisaged. EEC support - diplomatically or financially - 
would almost certainly not be forthcoming. On balance 
it would appear that the "constellation" reached its 
zenith in 1979 and while not yet buried is unlikely to 
rise again.
14Salisbury: Toward Programme Implementation
SADCC's first ministerial meeting was held in Salisbury, 
Zimbabwe in September 1980. Its main topics were 
preparations for SADCC-2 - the Maputo pledging conference - 
and progress in the priority work was set out at the 
Lusaka Summit. The official and ministerial meeting were 
chaired by Botswana in its role as SADCC coordinating 
state.
The Transport and Communications Commission had held two 
official and a ministerial meeting. These had prepared 
a draft convention and set out both priorities and a 
preliminary list of projects to be submitted to the 
Maputo donors conference which were approved by the 
Ministers.
A preliminary study on food security had been carried out 
by Zimbabwe and a meeting of experts from partner states 
was scheduled to prepare a final version for submission 
to the Maputo Conference. Botswana had contacted the 
International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid 
Tropics in respect to the creation of an INCRISAT sub­
regional centre for Southern Africa and a team was coming. 
Discussions on veterinary issues led to the decision to 
convene a specialists meeting - in the event held jointly 
with the food security conference. Zimbabwe announced its 
decision to withdraw from the South African based Southern 
African regional soul conservation and land utilisation 
body (SARCCUS).
Manpower development work had included a regional meeting 
and a consultancy survey of existing institutions. Steps
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toward broadening use of other national institutions - 
including publishing a regional directory - were discussed. 
Tanzania's preliminary paper on industrial coordination 
identifying possibilities in short term production and 
trade expansion from existing capacity, medium term 
exchange of data on projects under construction and 
longer term planning coordination of production development 
was taken as the basis for a subsequent officials meeting.
Further work was requested in respect to the financial 
institution, energy and secretariat development 
questions.
Conferencia do Maputo: Proposals and Pledges
The Second SADCC was held in Maputo, Mozambique in November 
1980 and attended by all SADCC states and over 30 governments 
and international development agencies.^  It was preceded 
by official and ministerial meetings which continued to 
receive reports on and supervise the work programme.
The Conference centred on three SADCC papers on Transport 
and Communications, Regional Food Security, and Strategy.^6 
The first laid out a multi year, phased programme covering 
rail, road, harbour, air, lake and sea transport and tele­
communications. The initial phase included over a hundred 
multi-country projects with probable costs of over $1.6 billion. 
A substantial portion related to rehabilitation of the 
Angolan, Zambian, Mozambican, Tanzanian and Zimbabwean 
rail systems which had suffered grievously from Rhodesian 
and South African backed insurgent raids and the impact of 
financial and import constraints on maintenance during the 
post 1974 economic crisis and the final phases of the 
Zimbabwe liberation struggle.
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to commit resources to that cooperation than at Arusha 
sixteen months earlier and provided a base from which 
to launch actual project implementation especially in 
transport and communications and in studies relating 
to food security and energy.
Beyond Maputo: Toward Implementation
The Maputo SADCC has been followed by a series of 
technical working meetings. The Transport and Communi­
cations Commission had met twice more by mid 1981 to 
work out coordination of implementation of the earlier projects. 
The ICRISAT mission had recommended establishment of a 
sub-regional centre and discussions on its location and 
programme were beginning.
An initial Industrial Coordination meeting in Dar es Salaam
concentrated on identifying areas for expansion of
production through regional trade in the short run and
27some of the practical means toward such action. A 
second meeting on longer term planning coordination was 
scheduled for the second half of 1981. The first meeting 
of officials on regional energy policy coordination was 
held in Luanda.
probably in Salisbury 
Additional meetings scheduled for 1981 were a Summit),and a
Ministerial meeting, probably in Mbabane and a 3rd SADCC
with external participation probably in Lilongwe.
Decisions on the site and structure of a small permanent
secretariat were also expected to be taken for 1982
implementation.
Sanctions: Divisive or Cohesive?
SADCC is quite overtly part of the Southern African 
liberation struggle. On the other hand, it is not the 
Front Line States and is committed to coordination of 
material economic action for development rather than to 
economic action against South Africa. To date, therefore,
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South Africa - while hardly concealing its dislike for
SADCC - has not threatened its neighbours with ending
Customs Union, migrant labour, sales of food or petroleum
products or more active destabilisation if they adhere to 
2 8SADCC. Thus the increasing likelihood of meaningful 
sanctions in respect to petroleum against the Republic 
could be seen as a threat to SADCC despite its commitment 
to economic liberation.
The strategy of the OAU and Non-Aligned States to secure
an Emergency Special of the GeneralAssembly under the
"uniting for peace" procedure, if a Security Council
Resolution is - as expected - vetoed, suggests that
sanctions to which the majority (probably 100 odd) states
voting for such a resolution would be obliaed to pay at
least some heed are likely. Both the March 1981 joint
meeting of the OAU Sanctions Committee and Committee of
2 919 (on support for front line states) and recent technical 
studies^ suggest that more thought has now gone into what 
type of sanctions would be practicable and potentially 
effective and what could be done to lessen their adverse 
impact on South Africa's neighbours.
The Arusha Meeting concentrated 'on oil sanctions centred 
on OAU - Third World oil exporting state cooperations in 
sanctions against tankers calling at South African (or
occupied Namibian) ports and against companies selling
31petroleum or products to South Africa. At the same 
time it stressed the need to achieve a coordinated plan 
to limit damage to neighbouring states and to ensure 
adequate petroleum supplies to these (Zimbabwe, Swaziland, 
Lesotho, Botswana and Malawi) non dependent on South 
African sources. It seems probable that it will seek to 
contact SADCC as a regional focus for these cost reducing 
operations.
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The immediate problems of the neighbouring states turn 
primarily on South Africa's reaction to sanctions.
Lesotho, Swaziland, Botswana and Zimbabwe (as well as 
Malawi) have quite clearly stated that they could not 
themselves enforce sanctions. However, a South Africa 
facing damage from sanctions would be likely to cut off 
their supplies of oil and possibly of other imports and 
of transport.
The most critical problems would be in respect to
petroleum, maize, transport, commercial infrastructure
and Lesotho with migrant labour only slightly less
32critical in the case of Botswana. Of these the first 
and third can only be solved regionally while the second 
and fourth could be alleviated regionally.
Repair of the pipeline from Beira to Umtali (scheduled 
33for late 1981) would allow importation of petroleum 
products for Zimbabwe and Botswana. Reactivation of the 
Feruka refinery (incredibly posited as requiring until 
late 1982 by Shell/BP) would allow Zimbabwe to refine 
for both. Swaziland can be supplied from the Maputo 
refinery and Malawi either by Maputo or by direct imports 
via Ncala and Beira. There is little doubt that Mozambique 
and Zimbabwe either directly or through the good offices of 
the OAU could secure access to OPEC state crude shipments 
at contract prices to meet the additional demand.
Similarly completion of repairs to the rail lines from 
Zimbabwe and Zambia to Maputo and Beira and the dredging 
of Beira's channel would allow Zambia; Zimbabwe, Zaire, 
and - less conveniently - Botswana to divert their traffic 
from South African routes. For Botswana, Swaziland and 
Lesotho a major problem would be their present lack of 
genuine import/export houses (as opposed to branches of
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South African wholesalers and small firms who have no
knowledge beyond Republic firm catalogues and quotations).
34While this gap can only be closed nationally, in the 
short run import/export houses in Zimbabwe, Zambia, 
Mozambique and Tanzania could handle some of the business 
on behalf of their landlocked partners.
Over 1980-81 South African maize exports to seven SADCC 
states (Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland, Zambia, Zimbabwe, 
Malawi, Mozambique - as well as Kenya to the north) seem 
likely to exceed 750,000 tonnes. In a year of even 
moderately bad harvests there is a regional deficit. 
However, in such a year three states Zimbabwe, Malawi 
and Tanzania might have surpluses equal to Swaziland, 
Botswana and Swaziland deficits while Zambia and 
Mozambique might be in approximate balance. Certainly 
regional food security coordination as planned by SADCC 
could help overcome the initial impact of any abrupt 
cessation of South African maize sales and reduce the 
need for massive purchases on the North American market.
Lesotho's problems in the event of sanctions appear 
beyond effective regional action. Because it is land­
locked in the Republic with five sixths of Basotho employ­
ment in South Africa, over two thirds of government
revenue from the Customs Union and about 80% of imports 
paid for by remittances and Customs Union payments, a 
massive financial injection and an airlift would seem 
necessary. Regional states can help present Lesotho's 
case and, especially, seek aid from less poor African 
states (e.g. Nigeria, Algeria) but the basic response 
would have to be international.
South Africa has regularly threatened its neighbours with 
economic reprisals if they cooperated in sanctions or in
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discussing their impact. It has backed these threats 
with various destabilizing actions even against the 
states which have been extremely correct in not 
providing facilities for liberation movement activities. 
Most observers had believed this strategy would work - so 
far as even verbal backing for sanctions and overt 
assistance to liberation movements went - at least in 
respect to Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland. However, 
in April 1981 Mozambique, Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland 
held a summit conference in Mbabane on coordinating 
security, including economic security, in the face of 
South African threats and destabilisation actions. This 
summit marked another shift toward regional solidarity 
on a defensive basis and another indication that impending 
sanctions could well hasten,not retard, the building of 
SADCC coordination.
The Broader Scene
Eastern and Southern African Preferential Trade Area
35negotiations continued during 1980 under Economic 
Commission for Africa auspices. Contrary to initial 
expectations, however, no agreed text was initialled 
much less submitted for ratification. In the context 
of increased interest in regionalism, this delay was on 
the face of it, surprising. At least five factors seem 
to have played a part.
First, the states oriented toward a transition to 
socialism - notably Angola, Ethiopia, Madagascar, 
Mozambique and Tanzania - raised objections to the 
classical laissez faire format of the draft proposals 
and pressed for greater incorporation of regionalfand 
protection of national/planning as well as tighter 
controls over participation by extra regional firms 
in PTA benefits.
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Second, the SADCC states - while fully disposed to join 
the PTA as an addition to SADCC -wished to safeguard the 
position of their own venture. On the one hand this made 
certain PTA proposals requiring all preferences to one state 
being opened to all unacceptable. This is especially 
true to Tanzania, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Botswana and 
Malawi each of which has significant special relations 
with at least one other SADCC member which could not, in 
practice, be generalized to all PTA members. On the 
other hand, the attention and effort required to create and 
begin building a programme for SADCC left limited time 
or personnel to devote to PTA.
Third, because the proposed PTA is basically a fairly 
conventional customs union plus clearing unioii, special 
problems arose in respect to Botswana, Lesotho and 
Swaziland. None saw itself as in a position to leave the 
South African Customs Union nor could the latter two 
contemplate leaving the Rand Monetary Area. As a result 
their accession to the PTA would either require special 
protocols rendering the nature of their membership 
ambiguous or formal South African assent. This problem 
had not arisen in SADCC because of its wider spectrum 
of coordination and more flexible pattern of operation.
Fourth, the proposed membership of the PTA is in some 
senses almost too wide but in others clearly too narrow.
The coherent concerns which activate SADCC simply do not 
involve either the states north of Tanzania or the island 
economies. On the other hand three states in ECA's 
moribund Central African sub-region are clearly linked 
to Eastern and Southern Africa. Two-Rwanda and Burundi - 
use Kenyan and Tanzanian ports and have substantial trade 
with Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania but not (with the tenuous, 
exception of Zaire) with other African economies. The 
third-Zaire-has significant transport and trade links
-  17 -
with Angola, Zambia and Tanzania (and historically with 
Rwanda and Burundi).
It is now proposed that Rwanda and Burundi - who have 
been observers at the PTA negotiations - should become 
members of the Eastern and Southern African sub-region.
The case of Zaire is less clear, but its clear desire 
to affiliate to SADCC suggests the logic of its accession 
to the PTA grouping.
Fifth, so long as Tanzania has a closed land border with 
Kenya and Kenya bars air traffic to Tanzania (albeit both 
allow trade by sea), severe problems exist for bringing 
the PTA into being. As there seems little likelihood of 
the East African Community asset and liability settlement, 
which Tanzania holds to be a precondition for restoring 
normal trade and transport links with Kenya,in the 
immediate future this issue seems likely to continue 
to embrangle PTA talks in 1981.
On the East African front three pieces of progress more than 
offset two negative developments. The Kagera Basin 
grouping of Tanzania-Rwanda-Burundi and - in principle 
from 1980 with formal accession in 1981 - Uganda 
completed a set of feasibility studies and mapped out a 
medium term plan covering transport, hydroelectric power 
and irrigation. Progress was made on construction of 
Rwanda-Tanzania road links.
A series of bilateral and trilateral and quadrilateral 
(with Zambia) meetings among Kenyia, Uganda and Tanzania - 
some at head of state level - restored a degree of high 
level contact among the old East African Community states 
unknown since the middle 1970's (and since 1970 so far as 
heads of state meetings are concerned). While these did 
not lead to immediate direct Tanzania-Kenya economic link 
strengthening (as opposed to cooperation on border control,
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smuggling and related frontier zone concerns), they did 
show a joint concern for assisting Uganda in overcoming 
its transit problems. Kenya, in particular, relaxed road 
restrictions and improved rail and port service. Like 
Tanzania it also deferred claims (including public 
corporation claims) for at least some arrears.
The old East African Development Bank's new charter was 
approved. This provides, in effect, for an Eastern and 
Southern African Development Bank to which any of the 
proposed PTA (and therefore any SADCC) members can adhere.
At the same time the management was strengthened and a 
search begun for new funds to meet anticipated new loan 
applications.
However, another regional corporation foundered in early 
1980. The East African National Shipping Line (Kenya - 
Uganda - Tanzania - Zambia) had faced increasing difficulties 
from 1978 with rasing oil prices and less rapidly rising 
freight rates plus increased competition by non-conference 
scheduled services and tramp steamers. A proposed injection 
of new equity was not completed, its three remaining ships 
were seized by creditors (two in Europe and one by the 
Tanzania Investment Bank in Dar es Salaam) and liquidators 
were called in. While the early 1981 quadrilateral 
summit spoke of recreating the line, early action seemed 
unlikely given the serious foreign exchange problems and 
dubious external credit ratings of all four states.
3 6The settlement of EAC assets made no real progress over 
1980-81. The Mediators Report in early 1980 apparently 
proposed that somewhat under 20% of the net assets go to 
Uganda, 35% to Tanzania, and somewhat over 45% to Kenya.
This would have entailed Kenya and Tanzania assuming all 
remaining external liabilities and making payments 
(substantial in the Kenya case) to Uganda.
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Initially, Uganda was disposed to agree. Kenya contended 
that it was being asked to assume toomany liabilities 
and rejected the payment to Uganda. Tanzania entered 
a procedural objection. Kenya had been unwilling or 
unable to give any meaningful data on Railways or Airways 
assets in Kenya (about half of total EAC and corporation 
assets) to the mediator. Tanzania contended that in the absence 
of such basic data it was impossible for a fair settlement 
to be recorded.
By early 1981 the situation had altered. Kenya was 
disposed to accept the mediators proposals, offsetting its 
liability to Uganda against transit traffic charges.
However, Uganda had shifted to claiming 33% of net assets 
on the basis that in life the EAC had always said that net 
worth was held equally among the partners - a theory the 
mediator had rejected as implausible although it certainly 
was the generally expressed position within the EAC.
Tanzania apparently expressed some sympathy for the Uganda 
position and restated its demand that Kenya produce 1977 
Railway and Airway asset lists and valuations. As no 
logical compromise between 18% and 33% exists on the 
Uganda asset share (the latter entailing a transfer from 
Kenya of over a billion shillings) and it is doubtful 
that four years after the event Kenya can any longer 
produce the initial asset data, resolution of the EAC 
assets question now appears to turn on a broader package 
agreement on East African economic relations being agreed by 
Presidents Moi, Nyerere and Obote.
Association: Cooperation, Influence or Manipulation?
By the Maputo Conference, SADCC had come to be viewed as 
a going concern of some significance by most Western European 
states and by the United States and Canada. On the whole,
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they appeared to view its emergence as potentially desirable - 
albeit for somewhat less than clear or unanimous reasons.
The European Economic Community continued to take the lead.
37Commissioner Claude Cheysson at the Maputo Conference
stressed EEC's concern with development/with regional
cooperation, with the reduction of dependence on South
Africa and with mutually beneficial trade relations. On
the face of it, this approach fitted well with President 
3 8Machel's stress on mutual economic interest and 
businesslike arrangements as the basis for SADCC and SADCC 
member state relationships with extra-regional states.
However, a distinct strain continued to exist in respect 
to the relations of Angola and Mozambique - SADCC's two 
non-ACP states - with EEC and, therefore, with EEC's support 
for much of the vital transport and communications programme. 
EEC clearly sought to use SADCC as an opportunity to press 
Angola and Mozambique to acceed to the second Lome Convention 
and implied that it could not finance substantial projects 
in non-ACP states.
Mozambique, in particular, did not welcome this exercise 
in persuasion. It argued that any project affecting several 
states, most of whom were ACP members, should logically be 
eligible for European Development Fund support even if part of 
it was in a non-ACP state. Further it objected to the form 
of the Lome Convention and to its wording in respect to 
achieve special, unique relationships both with EEC and CMEA. 
Angola took a somewhat similar position but seemed less 
concerned with the issues of acceeding to Lome as contrasted 
to a specially negotiated association.
With Zimbabwe and Namibia (SWAPO) EEC's campaign for accept­
ance fared better. Zimbabwe acceeded to Lome (with a beef 
and a sugar quota) within months of independence. The 
success of this exercise in pre and immediate post independence
-the status of West Berlin, seeking to
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diplomacy reinforced EEC's (or at least its aid Director 
Generalate's) efforts to treat SWAPO as a government in 
waiting and to achieve a broad consensus as to its 
accession to Lome. Talks at the Geneva Conference at 
a variety of levels appear to have cemented cordial 
relations and laid the basis for accession assuming 
EEC can deliver a satisfactory beef quota and Namibia 
(SWAPO) give EEC products treatment at least comparable 
to that accorded South African imports.
The United States, Canada, Federal Germany, the Netherlands 
and the United Kingdom also set up a coordinating group in 
respect to assistance to independent Southern African 
states. With the partial exception of the Netherlands ij 
each has very substantial trade and investment links with 
both the SADCC states and with South Africa. The committee, 
while clearly a step toward treating Southern Africa as a 
region in its own right and as separate from South Africa, 
has been variously interpreted in the region. On the one 
hand it is seen as concerned with reducing transport depend­
ence on South Africa and with shifting Southern African 
trade and mineral development from a South African to a North 
Atlantic orientation - both aims at least substantially 
compalable with SADCC. On the other hand, some of its 
members are seen as wishing to use such aid as a lever 
to encourage less active Front Line State support for 
SWAPO and South African Liberation Movements - a suspicion 
enhanced by the early policy statements of the Reagan
administration and the well known position of its Assistant
40Secretary for African Affairs, Chester Crocker.
The Nordic States have also taken a special interest in 
SADCC. This seems to flow from three factors; their own 
experience with loose but meaningful joint interest 
coordination, the number of significant Nordic bilateral 
cooperation programmes with SADCC states and the sustained
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Nordic state, party and public support for liberation 
efforts in Zimbabwe, Namibia and the Republic. One 
particular aspect has been the use of Swedish technical 
assistance personnel in the SADCC Transport and 
Communications Commission.
Prospects for Regional Cooperation
SADCC entered 1981 as a going concern with some momentum 
behind it. It had a number of programmes near operational 
stage and a priority position in the thinking of several 
governments. Internationally it had come to be recognised 
as at least potentially a meaningful channel for external 
assistance and for building up access to coal, metals and - 
in the case of Angola - petroleum.
On the other hand, the start of 1981 saw four SADCC states - 
Tanzania, Zambia, Malawi and Mozambique - facing severe 
economic crises turning on external payments imbalances 
and food supply problems from which no early exit could 
be discerned. Zimbabwe faced major challenges in 
maintaining reconstruction and a rapidly mounting trade 
deficit. Swaziland faced a recurrence of its slide 
toward structural external imbalance as sugar prices 
receded, while Lesotho (whose exports of goods cover 
only 5% of its imports) remained an economic captive of 
South Africa. Angola remained tied down by South African 
financed and manipulated UNITA insurgence and even more 
by increasingly savage and deep South African mercenary and 
regular unit assaults. Under the circumstances, the 
question of availability of resources and of attention to 
regional affairs necessarily remains problematic.
However, the crises push in two directions. The need to 
reduce extra-regional import dependence has been a factor 
in the rapid progress of Mozambique-Tanzania cooperation
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(to be extended to a free trade area in 1982) and is
clearly a goal at least Zimbabwe, Tanzania and Zambia see
as logically partially attainable within SADCC in the
short run while Lesotho, Botswana,, Malawi and Swaziland
have expressed similar positions albeit more on a medium 
41term basis. The growing probability of increased
sanctions against South Africa also increases the objective 
need for coordination by making the dangers and costs of 
continued dependence higher.
The most likely outcome is continued serious attention 
to SADCC - probably with a greater lag in concrete results 
than was hoped for at Lusaka and Maputo but with a much 
greater perseverance and seriousness of purpose than 
sceptics suggest. Precisely because South Africa on 
the defensive is an even greater threat to those dependant 
on her and because the foreign exchange and food crises of 
several Southern African states require exploring all 
meaningful possible solutions, SADCC is likely to remain 
significant and to hold the momentum it has achieved.
Outside the SADCC care, the outlook for regional cooperation 
ventures is less uniform. The Kagera. Basin grouping is 
likely to progress, but slowly given resource constraints.
The recent attempts to involve Kenya and Tanzania in a 
Nile Basin water cooperation scheme (or a limitation on 
their use of Lake Nyanza waters to view it from the other 
end of the telescope) seem unlikely to lead to any early 
results. EADB expansion probably depends on a decision 
by SADCC on financial institutions and clarification of 
Rwanda and Burundi eligibility for membership.
PTA negotiations may well lead to a treaty in 1982 but do 
not seem to have high priority for most participants 
Kenya and ECA being the exceptions. Greater Kenya - Uganda - 
Tanzania economic cooperation turns on the ability of the 
Ugandan government to restore its economy to functioning,
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order and its perception of Kenya's attitude toward and 
cooperation with that process. A stronger Uganda with 
genuinely good relations with Kenya might be able to 
serve as a catalyst for a Kenya-Tanzania rapprochement, 
but not a bankrupt one believing Kenya was at best 
indifferent to its problems and at worst aggravating 
and exploiting them.
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